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1 Introduction
Among industrialized nations, especially European countries suer from high and
persistent unemployment rates caused by real wages that are above the market
clearing level. As one basic reason, it has been emphasized that the existence of
trade unions is, in general, not compatible with full employment. Since (involuntary)
unemployment is traded o with the wage rate accruing to its members, this is the
‘price’ trade unions are willing to accept when maximizing the well-being of their
members. The economic literature has therefore pointed out that redesigning the tax
system might provide a potential remedy to such a distortion on the labor market
(see, for instance, Richter and Schneider 2001 and Koskela and Schöb 2002a,b). In
fact, tax policy can either be used to manipulate the labor demand elasticity or to
directly subsidize the labor market to lower the wage rate and boost employment,
respectively.
Within the well-known monopoly-union framework, the pure ability to exert
market power on the labor market is the basic reason for excessive wage claims and
involuntary unemployment. In addition, however, wages and unemployment might
be even higher if a country comprises many sector-specic monopoly trade unions,
each of which imposing an externality on the rest of the economy when deciding upon
the wage rate unilaterally. The result of such a decentralized equilibrium might be
referred to as excess unemployment. Prominent examples of such externalities are
the interactions between trade unions and the government sector, which can be
interpreted as a scal externality. To the extent unemployed union members receive
unemployment benets from a government-run insurance program, each individual
trade union is not fully aware of the true costs of wage induced layos since the
additional expenses for unemployment benets are spread over all employees within
the country. Thus, increasing each union’s nancial responsibility of running the
unemployment benet system of its members has a wage moderating eect (see
Holmlund and Lundborg 1988 as well as Sinko 2004). Another example is the
potential hump-shaped pattern of the real wage rate depending on the degree of
centralization in the wage setting (Calmfors and Drill 1988). For intermediate
levels of centralization, an increase in the union’s wage rate might raise the price
level of the rms’ output, representing a loss in real wage for all union members in
other sectors. In contrast, for the extreme cases of fully decentralized and centralized
wage setting, such a price increase is either not possible due to the existence of close
substitutes or falls back on all union members as an increase in the general price
level, respectively.1 This hump-shaped relation, however, is alleviated the more
1See Calmfors (1993) for other types of externalities dealt with in the literature.
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countries are integrated in a world market producing highly substitutable goods
(Danthine and Hunt 1994).
Simple stylized facts support the view that the unemployment rate is consid-
erably lower in countries with centralized bargaining (e.g., Austria, Norway and
Sweden) than in economies with a very decentralized bargaining structure (United
Kingdom, United States, France); see Mares (2006). In addition, there is also em-
pirical evidence indicating that among the two extreme cases it is full centralization
that performs better in terms of employment compared with decentralized bargain-
ing structure (see, e.g., Belot and van Ours 2001). More detailed evidence by Belot
and van Ours (2004) or Nickell et al. (2005) suggests that the interactions with
other labor market institutions seem to matter. They nd that in the presence of
decentralized trade unions unemployment is higher when there is a high degree of
employment protection or union density.
In the present paper, we abstract from the potential externalities mentioned
afore. Rather, we restrict our wage setting analysis to a quite fundamental form of
a prisoners’ dilemma situation among small decentralized (monopoly) trade unions.
The basic externality at work in this paper is as follows. When a trade union
claims a higher wage, with the corresponding loss in employment being the cost of
this additional wage income, it imposes an external eect on all other trade unions
simply because the unemployed members of the latter now face a lower probability
of getting re-employed. We choose this unemployment externality to be the driving
force of excess unemployment in our setting. In addition, to draw a more realistic
picture of trade union behavior, we also allow each trade union to decide upon both
the wage rate per hour and the hours of work per employee in the sector. Since
both union instruments aect the rm’s labor demand, both are able to impose an
externality on all other sectors. Obviously, the resulting equilibrium entails room
for improvements in terms of welfare and employment. This is the starting point
of the present paper. Our basic question will then be the following. Even in the
absence of any government intervention, can trade unions eectively benet from
coordination agreements that aim a internalizing this externality? Clearly, if all
trade unions are perfectly able to agree on both available instruments, the answer
is in the armative. But what happens when trade unions are unable to commit
themselves to a joint agreement that captures both the wage rate and the hours of
work? Can the internalization of external eects work if only partial coordination
is possible in the sense that only one of the unions instruments is cooperatively
chosen, whereas the respective other instrument can nevertheless be freely chosen
by all trade unions involved?
The focus of the present paper is therefore the following. Assume that a country
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cannot simply move from a very decentralized structure to a centralized one by
installing a trade union that is common to all rms in the country. What is then
the potential scope for cooperation among all decentralized trade unions? Is there
a chance to mimic centralized trade unions by jointly agreeing on some projects but
still retaining the decentralized structure as such?
As one example, we might refer to the German Alliance for Jobs (Bündnis für
Arbeit), i.e. central negotiations between trade unions, employers’ representatives
and the government to boost employment, where the metal sector trade union (IG
Metall) was the rst to announce that it would leave the negotiations if the wage
rate appears on the agenda. In fact, the main (and only) purpose of the trade union
leaders was to negotiate on the working time by reducing overtime or weekly hours
of work and promoting early retirement programs.
On the other hand, many European countries have undertaken some eort to
establish social pacts between trade unions and the governments (see Mares 2006).
These pacts often comprise wage moderation in return for changes in tax policy
or social security regulation. In most cases, however, the hours of work are not
explicitly on the agenda.2
Rather than analyzing a multi-party contract between trade unions and other
potential bargaining parties such as the government or employers, we study the eec-
tiveness of partial agreements among decentralized trade unions only. In particular,
our approach diers from the previous literature primarily because it deals with
decentralized trade unions. In contrast, Calmfors (1985), Booth and Schiantarelli
(1987) as well as Booth and Ravallion (1993) simplify their analysis to some extent
by assuming that all workers are members of a centralized trade union. However, as
has been set out above, countries with a centralized union structure have remark-
ably lower unemployment rates since they do not suer excess unemployment. This
is an important dierence since centralized unions have no intrinsic motivation to
further use their instruments to change the employment level. Instead, these au-
thors have to rely on exogenous reductions in working time and derive at ambiguous
employment eect when taking the subsequent wage response into account.
To address this issue in the presence of decentralized unions, the paper is orga-
nized in the following way. In section 2, we set up a simple model of decentralized
monopoly trade unions deciding upon the wage rate per hour and the hours of work.
Since the Nash equilibrium implies unemployment that is higher than under cen-
tralized wage setting, section 3 discusses dierent forms of cooperation among trade
2As one exception, the Dutch Wassenaar agreement explicitly stated that wage moderation was
exchanged for a reduction in working time.
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unions. In particular, we distinguish between full cooperation and the more realistic
scenario of partial cooperation. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 The model
We consider a single small open economy that consists of a xed large number of
identical rms or sectors producing a homogenous output good. The good is sold
to the world market at a constant price.
Turning to the rm level rst, we assume that each rm produces the homogenous
output good  using ‘labor’ as the only variable input according the production
function  =  () where  0  0  00  0 and the index  refers to an individual
sector. The production function is common to all rms within the country. For
notational convenience, other factors are assumed to be xed in supply and are
therefore suppressed in our formulation. We dene ‘labor’  as eective labor input
that comprises both the number of employed workers 	 in the sector and the hours of
work per employed worker 
 Following, e.g., Booth and Schiantarelli (1987) as well
as Booth and Ravallion (1993), we allow working time and employment to be less
than perfectly substitutable. Eective labor input is therefore specied as follows:
 = (
)
 	 (1)
where 0    1 in order to capture potential decreasing returns to scale of a longer
working day, e.g., due to fatigue eects. This specication implies

	
	

= 1
i.e. for given hours of work per employee, a one percentage increase in employment 	
always translates into a one percentage increase in eective labor input. In contrast,
for the hours of work we have






=   1
i.e. for employment kept constant, a one percentage increase in working hours does
not increase eective labor input by more than one percentage. In particular, note
that  = 1 is the special case of employment and working hours being ‘perfect
substitutes’. For this case, eective labor input is simply given by the total working
hours of all employees. On the other hand,   1 indicates that the hours of work
are less than perfectly substitutable to employment 	
Since we suppose the wage rate  per hour as well as the hours of work 
 to
be choice variables of a sector-specic monopoly trade union, each rm takes these
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variables as given. Normalizing the constant output price to one, each rm then has
the right to manage, i.e. it chooses employment 	 so as to maximize its prot:
max

 () 
	 (2)
subject to (1). This yields
(
)
 0() = 

and implicitly denes labor demand of rm  as 	 = 	( 
)
Following a change in the wage rate or the hours of work, respectively, each rm
will adjust employment according to:
	

=


(
)2 00
 0 (3)
	


=
(1 )
(
)
2  00
  	


 0 (4)
In terms of elasticities, we are able to express the labor demand elasticity with
respect to the hours of work as a weighted average of the labor demand with respect
to the wage rate and 1 with  being the weight:
	




	
= (1 ) 	


	
  (5)
The interpretation of (5) is straightforward. For the extreme case  = 0 the hours
of work would collapse to a pure cost factor, equivalent to the wage rate. Both labor
demand elasticities would therefore coincide. On the other hand, for the special
case of  = 1 the hours of work are perfectly substitutable to employment. It is
only the total working hours, i.e.  = 	
 that is relevant to the rm as the input
factor of production. For a given factor price of the eective labor input,  there
is a one-to-one relation between 	 and 
 in terms of percentages. Since the working
hours enter the production function, labor demand is more elastic with respect to
the wage rate than the hours of work, the exception being  = 0
For later use, note that, in general, the labor demand elasticities are not constant
in the level of eective labor input, but will change in response to changes in the
union’s policy instruments. Dening  and  as the elasticities of labor demand
with regard to the wage rate and the hours of work,3 respectively, we have


= (1 )

  =  
 (6)


=


·
1 
μ
1 +
 000
 00

¶¸
Q 0 (7)



= (1 )


·
1 
μ
1 +
 000
 00

¶¸
Q 0 (8)
3The index  has been dropped for notational convenience.
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Indeed, standard one-factor production functions produce  000  0 as a property and
support the above ambiguity. According to (7) and (8), the elasticity of the above
elasticities with regard to 
 and  are also connected by the parameter  i.e.






= (1 )



 (9)
The parameter  therefore has two impacts on the labor demand elasticities. On
the one hand, it determines the extent to which the labor demand elasticity 
can be inuenced by either  or 
 compared with  [see equation (6)]. For the
extreme case  = 1 it is constant at  = 1. On the other hand, according to
(9), the impact of the hours of work on the labor demand elasticity  diers from
the wage impact on this elasticity by the factor (1  ) Intuitively, the change in
the labor demand elasticity  crucially depends on the eective labor input .4
In turn, the hours of work have a positive direct eect on  given the number of
employed workers, which is not the case for the wage rate. The negative indirect
eect on  due to the reduction in employment can oset the former eect only for
 = 1 Otherwise a negative impact of eective labor input remains.
As mentioned above, both the hours of work in sector  as well as the wage
rate in this sector are determined by a corresponding sector-specic monopoly trade
union. Each union’s membership is assumed to be xed throughout. As is usual
in the literature on trade union behavior, each small monopoly trade union acts
as a Stackelberg leader towards the rm. Thus, when choosing  and 
 it takes
into account that the rm retains the ‘right to manage’ according to labor demand
	 = 	( 
) However, each sector-specic trade union is assumed to be suciently
small and is therefore unable to inuence the countrywide employment level and
thus, in turn, the probability that unions members are employed in the rest of the
economy.
Since trade unions represent the preferences of theirs member, we have to specify
the utility of union members. Each member’s utility function is assumed to be
additive and linear in income. If employed in rm , the household works 
 hours
and receives a wage rate of  per hour, both variables being determined by the trade
union the household is organized in. Since employment is associated with forgone
leisure, we capture the disutility of supplying labor by the term (
) 0  0 00  0
with (0) = 05 Thus, an unemployed household receives a zero utility level.
The objective of the union  is to maximize the members’ welfare which is given
4The labor demand elasticity with respect to the wage rate is given by  =  0()[ 00()]
5See, e.g, Earle and Pencavel (1990) for a similar procedure.
6
by
max

 = 	( 
) [
  (
)] + [  	( 
)] (1 ) [
 (
)]  (10)
where  denotes the xed number of union members of which 	 are employed
in sector  and   	 in the rest of the country. The subindex  refers to the
individual union-rm relationship and variables without index denote countrywide
averages which cannot be aected by a small trade union. In particular,  denotes
the countrywide unemployment rate such that the probability of re-employment
(1) is therefore given by 	 Since the number of trade unions and rms is xed
and we restrict our attention to symmetric outcomes, all variables without index 
are a measure of countrywide values. In the objective function (10) we have assumed
that union members are perfectly mobile between rms within the country under
consideration (Hoel 1991). A union member who is not employed in rm  receives
the average wage  and works for 
 hours since these numbers prevail in the rest of
the country. On the other hand, if a union member is not employed outside rm 
which happens with probability  her payo is zero since  = 0 and (0) = 06
Taking into account the rm’s response to changes in trade union ‘policy vari-
ables’, each union’s rst-order conditions require, respectively,


= 0 	
 + 	

½

  (
) 	

[
 (
)]
¾
= 0 (11)
and



= 0 	 [  0(
)] + 	


½

  (
) 	

[
 (
)]
¾
= 0 (12)
i.e. for both instruments, the marginal benet (at constant employment) must be
equal to its marginal cost (due to the reduction in employment). For later use, note
that the second-order conditions must satisfy
2
2
= 2

	

+
2	
2
½

  (
) 	

[
 (
)]
¾
 0
and
2

2
=
2	

2
½

  (
) 	

[
 (
)]
¾
+ 2 [  0(
)] 	


 	00(
)  0
In a symmetric equilibrium, each union has solved the same problem. We are
therefore able to write  =  and 
 = 
 For the analysis in section 3, it proves
6Recall that we fully ignore the government sector and therefore abstract from unemployment
benets accruing to unemployed union members.
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convenient to express the rst-order conditions in the symmetric Nash equilibrium
in terms of elasticities. We obtain


[
 (
)] ¡1 

¢ +  = 0 (13)
and

 [  0(
)]
[
 (
)] ¡1 

¢ +  = 0 (14)
i.e. for both ‘policy’ instruments of the trade union, a one percentage increase of
this instrument must balance the percentage gain in utility with the percentage
reduction in employment (see, e.g., Booth 2002). Union members are only willing
to supply labor if they receive a positive rent from doing so. Hence, 
 (
)  0
and the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by unemployment, 	  1 [see
equation (13)]. Since trade unions also determine the hours of work, each union
member who is employed will be underemployed in the Nash equilibrium,   0(
)
[see equation (14)]. Substituting (13) into (14) yields the following relation between
the employment eects of the union’s policy instruments


=
  0(
)

 (15)
i.e. the relative percentage employment eects of the union’s instruments must be
equal to the relative percentage benets of the two policy instruments. As a common
feature in the presence of monopoly power, the Nash equilibrium implies that labor
demand is elastic in the wage rate,   1 This follows from straightforward
manipulation of expression (13). Recalling equation (5), a similar property applies
to the labor demand elasticity regarding the hours work, i.e.   1, where the
case of  = 1 holds for  = 1 The expression in (5) then also allows us to infer
that, in terms of percentages, the hours of work cannot have a stronger impact on
labor demand that the wage rate, i.e.   
Since we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria we are able to rewrite the
second-order conditions as
2
2
=
	



μ
2 +
 000
 00

¶
 0 (16)
and
2

2
=
2	

2
[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶
+ 2 [  0(
)] 	


 	00(
)  0
Note that central wage setting, e.g., by a countrywide monopoly trade union, will
also entail unemployment and a wage rate that exceeds the marginal disutility of la-
bor. However, the unemployment rate will be lower compared with the decentralized
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scenario (see Appendix 1 for details). Consequently, there is room for improvement
in terms of employment if all decentralized unions coordinate their policies. The
next section examines to which extent such cooperation can be eective, depending
on the policy instruments that are included in such an agreement.
3 Cooperation among decentralized unions
When discussing coordination, we restrict our analysis to marginal steps, starting
from the symmetric uncoordinated Nash equilibrium. As a point of reference, we rst
discuss full cooperation in subsection 3.1, where all unions agree to jointly change
one policy instrument while keeping the remaining variable constant. Subsections
3.2 and 3.3 then relax the latter assumption, i.e. we analyze the eectiveness of a
joint change in the wage (hours of work) when all trade are still free to choose their
hours of work (wage rate) non-cooperatively. Note that we do not attempt to explain
why the one or the other form of cooperation is established. Our basic motivation
is that it seems to be unrealistic that the participants of such a cooperation are able
or willing to agree on several issues.
3.1 Full cooperation in the wage rate and the hours of work
We refer to the special case of full cooperation in  and 
 if all trade unions agree
to jointly change one of their policy instruments while keeping the remaining instru-
ment constant. Let us rst consider a joint agreement that prescribes to marginally
reduce the wage rate at constant hours of work. For notational clarity, we omit the
index  if joint changes are considered, since all sectors are identical and face the
same reactions. Such an agreement boosts employment in each sector:
	

¯¯¯
¯
	=0
=

12
 00
 0
and thus, in turn, output and prots according to, respectively,


¯¯¯
¯
	=0
=  0

	

¯¯¯
¯
	=0
 0
and
[  
	]

¯¯¯
¯
	=0
= 
	  0 (17)
For each sector, these numbers are quantitatively identical to the eects of changes
in the wage rate carried out by the respective trade union, unilaterally.
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Most importantly, such coordination in the wage rate now aects each union’s
outside utility by lowering the countrywide probability of being unemployed. The
welfare impact can therefore be written as


¯¯¯
¯
	=0
=
 	

½

	 + [
 (
)] 	

¯¯¯
¯
	=0
¾
=  	


	  0 (18)
Hence, if all trade unions are able to commit on both a joint wage moderation and
a given number of working hours, all unions are better o. As a consequence of
the envelope theorem, all wage impacts which are present in the case of a unilat-
eral change in  have no welfare impact, since the symmetric uncoordinated Nash
equilibrium serves as the starting point. Thus, (in case of a joint wage cut) the only
relevant eects are the reduction of wage income for the households not employed in
rm  and the higher re-employment probability if not employed in sector  Using
the rst-order condition (13), allows us to unambiguously sign this expression.
Correspondingly, a second form of cooperation comprises a joint change in the
hours of work with the wage rate kept constant at its previous level. Again, a
positive employment eect emerges if all unions reduce 
 :
	


¯¯¯
¯
	=0
=
(1 )

2 00
  	


 0
In turn, the output eect as well as the impact on rm prots depend on  since:



¯¯¯
¯
	=0
=
(1 ) 0

 00
 0
and
[  
	]


¯¯¯
¯
	=0
= 	(1 )  0 (19)
Thus, we can only expect positive eects on output and prots, if employment and
working hours are not perfectly substitutable to the rm. Intuitively, recall that for
 = 1 eective labor input is constant in the hours of work since the direct eect is
exactly balanced by the indirect eect via reduced employment.
Finally, the joint change in the hours of work (at a constant ) yields the fol-
lowing welfare eect:



¯¯¯
¯
	=0
=
 	

½
	 [  0(
)] + [
 (
)] 	


¯¯¯
¯
	=0
¾
=  	

	 [  0(
)]  0
(20)
Trade unions will therefore be better o if they agree to reduce working time and can
commit themselves to keep the wage rate constant. Again, the only relevant eects
stem from households who are not employed in rm  Even though the joint cut in
the hours of work reinforces the underemployment of employed households, this loss
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in total income is exactly compensated by the gain in employment in this sector. In
addition, however, the joint reduction in 
 increases employment in all other sectors
and thus, in turn, the probability of employment outside sector  Hence, using the
rst-order conditions of the symmetric Nash equilibrium, which serves as a starting
point of coordination, the expression in (20) is unambiguously negative.
3.2 Partial cooperation in the wage rate
In contrast to the preceding subsection, we now reject the idea that unions are able
to form an agreement on both the wage rate and the hours of work. Instead, we
now suppose that trade unions are only able to agree on even smaller projects. In
particular, we consider a joint change in only one of the two instruments ( or 
),
whereas the coordination arrangement does not cover the remaining variable. The
latter can then freely be chosen by all trade unions.
In this subsection, we suppose that all trade unions have agreed to jointly reduce
their wage rate to benet from the subsequent reduction in the unemployment rate.
Since the trade unions were assumed to be small, such a reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate (i.e. the probability that unions members earn no wage income at all)
has not been possible for each union individually. However, since the hours of work
are not a part of the agreement that stipulates the joint reduction in the wage rate,
each union might now perceive its individual choice of 
 to be incorrect and aims
at a corresponding adjustment.
To be more detailed, recall that the hours of work have been determined accord-
ing to the rst-order condition 
 = 0 Again, it is convenient to rewrite this
condition in terms of elasticities, using the fact that the starting point (as well as
the nal equilibrium) is symmetric [see equation (14)]. In the uncoordinated (sym-
metric) optimum, the net benet from changing the hours of work (by a marginal
unit) can therefore be written as
(
) = 
 [  0(
)] +  [
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶
= 0 (21)
Since the wage coordination will, in general, alter this condition, each union has the
incentive to use the hours of work to restore this condition again. In doing so, each
single union will, again, treat the (un)employment rate as constant. However, as
all unions face the same incentive to adjust their hours of work, the countrywide
(un)employment rate will be subject to changes during this adjustment. Thus, to
nd out the extent to which all unions have nally adjusted their hours of work in
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response to the initial wage coordination, we need to determine



= (
)

·
μ
(
)


¶1
 (22)
where, again, the changes in  and 
 are carried out by all countries and the index
 is suppressed for clarity. Equation (22) then gives us the uncoordinated, but
joint adjustment of 
 that is necessary to restore 
 = 0 if all unions face a
coordinated change in the wage rate and the nal equilibrium is symmetric again.
Note that joint changes in 
 or , respectively, trigger the same employment
reaction for each trade union as has been the case for unilateral changes; see the
eects on 	 in (3) and (4). In addition, however, the employment level of the whole
country, i.e. 	 is changed. Due to our assumption of symmetric unions, these
responses are equivalent to the ones given by (3) and (4).
In detail, we have
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which must be negative in sign for the sake of stability of the initial Nash equilibrium.
To see this, bear in mind that the expression(
) stated in (21) gives each union’s
marginal net benet from altering the hours of work (which must be zero to establish
an optimum for the individual trade union). Now suppose that the hours of work
for all unions are slightly lower than in the Nash equilibrium so that this net benet
is positive and each union has an incentive to increase its working hours. Since
all unions face the same incentive to increase the hours of work, the corresponding
joint increase must reduce the net benet from increasing this variable to reach a
stable Nash equilibrium, i.e. to eliminate the incentive to change the hours of work
any further. Thus, whether unions choose higher or lower working hours following
a wage coordination solely depends on the sign of the rst term in (22):

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This term becomes
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(24)
where its sign is ambiguous a priori, depending on how a joint reduction in the
wage rate aects the marginal benet and marginal cost of changing the hours of
work. For all employed union members, the joint wage cut lowers the additional
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rent from raising the working hours which ceteris paribus renders an increase in
working hours less interesting for the trade union; see the rst term on the right
hand side of (24). On the other hand, a joint reduction in the wage rate also lowers
the total rent from being employed. As a consequence of the lower opportunity cost
for members being laid o (due to an increase in 
), unions will call for more working
hours, ceteris paribus; see the second term in (24). The third term then captures
that the coordinated wage cut is able to reduce the countrywide unemployment
rate. The cost of increasing the working hours are therefore reduced due to the
higher re-employment probability for unemployed union members. Finally, the last
term on the right hand side of (24) represents the way in which the trade union’s
marginal cost of increasing the hours of work are aected by a joint change in the
wage rate. In particular, the impact on the labor demand elasticity is important,
which is ambiguous in sign. Depending on whether the labor demand elasticity with
respect to 
 is augmented (alleviated), in absolute terms, when a collective wage
cut is carried out, increasing the hours of work becomes more (less) costly to the
trade unions. In general, we are not able to conclude whether or not the trade
unions’ response is to have eventually raised their working hours in the new Nash
equilibrium. A clear-cut statement can only be made if the labor demand elasticity
with respect to the hours of work remains constant or becomes less elastic following
the initial wage cut, i.e.   0 For this case, we unambiguously nd that
trade unions have responded by increasing the hours of work; see Appendix 2 for
details.
Employment eect
The overall eect on employment is given by the sum of the initial employment
eect due to the joint reduction in the wage rate (at constant hours of work) and
the subsequent joint change in the hours of work (at a constant wage rate), where
the latter must be weighted with the extent to which all unions have nally adjusted

 in the new Nash equilibrium:
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¯¯¯
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 (25)
For notational parsimony, we suppress the characterization 
 = 0 and  = 0 in
what follows if the respective variable is kept constant. We solely use the partial
derivative notation in what follows. Plugging (23) and (24) into (22) and substitut-
ing the result [together with (13) and (15)] into expression (25), we derive at (see
Appendix 3):
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Obviously, the overall employment eect is ambiguous a priori. To provide an in-
tuitive explanation for this result, a suitable starting point is to think of the zero
employment eect as the benchmark scenario. Loosely speaking, if the hours of work
were an instrument that perfectly mimics the wage rate, the trade union would be
able to exactly return to where they started, i.e. the initial Nash equilibrium. The
employment eect would be zero in this case. To the extent these instruments have
dierent impacts on the rst-order condition (
) = 0 a non zero employment
eect emerges. Equation (26) can therefore be interpreted as describing the dieren-
tial eect of  and 
, respectively, that are able to constitute an employment eect.
Since (
)
  0, the signs of the terms in brackets on the right hand side of
(26) are important. A positive (negative) expression indicates that a joint wage cut
boosts (reduces) total employment ceteris paribus.
Let us rst turn to the last term in brackets which depends on the change of
the marginal disutility of the hours of work. As   0 and 00  0 this eect
is ceteris paribus associated with a non-negative overall employment eect. It will
vanish for the extreme case of a constant marginal disutility of labor (00 = 0). What
is the intuition behind this mechanism? The starting point of coordination is the
symmetric Nash equilibrium which is characterized by each trade union’s optimal
choice of the wage rate and the hours of work (and thus, in turn, employment).
The joint wage cut then disturbs this equilibrium such that each union perceives
the allocation as no longer the individually most preferred one. Technically, the
collective change in the wage rate changes the rst-order condition which gives the
optimality rule for the hours of work. Since all trade unions are still allowed to
change the hours of work, they use this instrument to restore this condition again.
Intuitively, trade unions try to use the hours of work to imperfectly mimic the initial
equilibrium that has been most preferred from an individual point of view. In the
course of the adjustment, the marginal disutility of the working hours is changed.
This serves as one channel to partially restore (
) = 0 However, the initial
joint change in the wage rate could not have an impact on the marginal disutility
of working time. Thus, in an attempt to go back to the initial Nash equilibrium by
increasing the hours of work in response to the joint wage cut, the marginal disutility
of labor is increased. Since this mechanism already restores the rst-order condition
(
) = 0 to some extent, the total change in 
 is lower than what would have
been necessary to perfectly undo the initial stimulus, i.e. the reduction in 
Turning to the intuition of the rst two terms in (the brackets of) equation (26),
we should again be detailed in the interpretation of the eects which are at work.
Let us rst consider the impact on the elasticity of labor demand  Starting with
the initial collective wage cut, the labor demand elasticity might become less elastic
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(  0) or more elastic (  0). In turn, this has repercussions on
the way trade unions use their hours of work as an adjustment device. To be more
specic, in the former case, where   0 when competing back to the initial
Nash equilibrium by raising 
 trade unions use this adjustment too excessively.
The reason is that the initial reduction in the wage rate ‘distorts’ the choice of 

in a way that makes unions more aggressive in using the hours of work. This is a
case in which, ceteris paribus, the overall employment eect is to have even lower
employment after the joint wage cut. The opposite holds for   0 where
labor demand becomes more elastic so that unions do not use the hours of work to
fully go back to the employment level that prevailed in the initial Nash equilibrium.
An analogous interpretation applies when all unions use the working hours as an
instrument to respond to wage agreement. This time it is the adjustment, i.e. the
joint increase in 
 that renders labor demand more or less elastic. For 
  0
the joint adjustment (that is to say, the increase in 
) implies that labor demand
becomes more elastic with respect to the hours of work. As a consequence, the
adjustment is not carried out to the ‘full extent’, i.e. to restore the initial Nash
equilibrium, as it becomes more costly. For 
  0, in contrast, the joint
increase in 
 renders the labor demand elasticity less elastic which, in turn, induces
the unions to raise the working hours even further.
The factor   1 then corrects for the following. First, as explained
above the elasticity  is altered when employment changes due to both the initial
coordination stimulus as well as the trade unions’ response. Second, note that the
impact of the wage rate on labor demand is larger than the impact of 
 (of equal
size) on labor demand. Thus, the factor   1 scales down the -eect
compared to the 
-eect.
Some special cases
In order to judge the direction of the employment eect, it might be interesting
to examine some special cases. First, for  = 1 and 00 = 0 there is no employment
eect, i.e. the agreement which marginally changes the wage rate but fails to cover
the hours of work is not able to aect employment. The former denotes the special
case of employment and working hours being perfect substitutes in determining the
eective labor input to production. It ensures that the labor demand elasticity 
remains constant at  = 1 and is therefore not aected by the collective wage
cut nor the joint adjustment of the working hours. The latter may be the even
more restrictive scenario of a constant marginal disutility of labor (00 = 0), an
assumption that is frequently used in the literature on union wage setting (see, for
instance, Boeters and Schneider 1999 or Koskela and Schöb 2002a). As has been
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pointed out before, 00 = 0 eliminates one mechanism that prevents the trade unions
to exactly return to the employment level of the initial Nash-equilibrium. Clearly,
for  = 1 and 00  0 the joint wage cut can eectively boost total employment even
if trade unions engage in ‘competition’ by using the working hours as an instrument
to maximize their well-being.
Turning to the more relevant scenario of labor and capital being less than per-
fectly substitutable (  1), we now have a case where the repercussions on the
labor demand elasticity  become important. The impact on  seems to be
stronger the smaller is ; see equation (6). However, we have to take into account
that this labor demand elasticity is not only aected by the joint wage cut, but
also by the subsequent joint reaction in the hours of work. It is therefore important
to examine in which direction this value is eventually inuenced after the working
time adjustment is carried out. First, inspecting equations (6) to (8) reveals that

 · 
 = (1  ) ·  As has been set out before, the reason for the
dierential impact goes back to the dierent eects on eective labor input because
the hours of work have a positive direct eect on  which is not the case for the wage
rate. Since the 
 ·
-eect is smaller than the  ·-eect by the factor
(1  ) and the  · -eect itself is scaled down by the ratio   1
we are left with comparing  and (1) Inspecting equation (5) then shows
that   (1  ) =  i.e. the  · -eect is stronger than the

 · 
-eect by a factor that is proportional to the parameter  In fact, for
 = 0 (together with 00 = 0) again, a zero employment eect emerges. This time,
the reason is twofold. First, both labor demand elasticities coincide so that the
scaling factor in front of the -eect vanishes. Second, referring back to
equations (6) to (8), a percentage change in the wage rate or the hours of work have
an equal impact on the labor demand elasticity 
Summing up, for 00 = 0 and 0    1 the sign of the overall employment
eect depends on whether the initial wage cut renders the labor demand elasticity
 more or less elastic:

½
	

¯¯¯
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00=0
¾
= 
½
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
¾

Thus, if the initial joint wage cut renders the labor demand elasticity with respect
to the hours of work more elastic (less elastic), i.e.   0 (  0), the
overall level of employment in each sector will be higher (lower) when trade unions
have optimally responded to the reduction in  by using the hours of work.
Welfare eect
Since the collective reduction in the wage rate is associated with a joint adjustment
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in working hours and employment, a natural question is whether or not all union
members eventually benet from such a partial cooperation after the adjustment
has taken place. The overall eect on union members’ welfare is written as:


=


+






 (27)
i.e. it comprises the initial welfare gain of a joint reduction in the wage rate (at a
constant 
), i.e.  and the subsequent welfare eect of the joint adjustment
of the hours of work (at a constant ), i.e. 
 weighted with the magnitude
of the adjustment. Both welfare terms on the right hand side of equation (27) have
already been determined in subsection 3.1. Plugging (18), (20) and (22) into (27),
the overall welfare eect is then given by (see Appendix 4):
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Not surprisingly, the direction of the welfare eect is identical to the employment
eect of partial wage coordination, i.e. boosting employment is welfare enhancing.
Since the starting point of coordination is the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium and
the wage rate, the hours of work and thus employment are optimally chosen by each
individual trade union, welfare eects can only arise if collective marginal actions
can inuence the countrywide employment level as it determines the unions’ outside
option. Consequently, the interpretation of (26) also applies to the welfare eect of
(28).
Repercussion on prot income
Even though the cooperation is among decentralized trade unions only, repercus-
sion on each sector’s prot income may be important in terms of a more compre-
hensive welfare analysis. Since employment is optimally chosen by each rm in the
Nash equilibrium, any employment eects, which partial wage coordination might
have, cannot aect prots. Following a joint wage cut with a subsequent adjustment
in the hours of work, prot income is aected according to:
[  
	]

= 
	
·






(1 ) + 1
¸
 (29)
Interestingly, for the extreme case of  = 1 the impact on prot income is indepen-
dent on whether the hours of work are kept constant during the wage coordination
[see equation (17) in subsection 3.1] or can be freely chosen by trade unions after-
wards. Note that the reason for this, somewhat surprising, result cannot be that
trade unions voluntarily choose not to adjust their working hours. On the contrary,
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for employment and working hours being perfect substitutes ( = 1), the labor de-
mand elasticity  remains constant and trade unions will react to a wage cut by
increasing the hours of work [see equation (24) and the discussion thereafter]. To
be more specic, since  = 1 the joint adjustment of the hours of work does not
alter eective labor input  = 	
 which, in turn, implies that prots remain un-
changed in the course of the joint adjustment of the working hours. Thus, recipients
of prot income should not be concerned whether the wage coordination agreement
among trade unions covers the hours of work or not, given that employment and
working hours are perfect substitutes.
3.3 Partial cooperation in the hours of work
As has been set out before, we observe that the hours of work are on the agenda of
joint agreements (between trade unions and rms), while unions refuse to talk about
the wage rate jointly. The German Alliance for Jobs is a prominent example. It
may therefore be interesting to consider the consequences of a partial coordination
in the hours of work.
From a theoretical perspective, Calmfors (1985) and Booth and Schiantarelli
(1987) have analyzed a reduction in working time and its repercussion on employ-
ment when the wage rate is subject to changes afterwards. However, their starting
point is a country-wide trade union that covers all workers so that unemployment
is less severe than in countries with decentralized trade unions. The focus of these
previous studies is therefore not on excess unemployment due to externalities among
unions.
To make the scenario suitable to many other countries, let us therefore assume
that, on a national level, all decentralized unions agree to marginally change (reduce)
their working hours, whereas the choice of the wage rate is not subject to the joint
agreement and can therefore be adjusted afterwards in an optimal manner from each
union’s perspective.
This time, each union is free to choose the wage rate such that in the new
equilibrium the rst-order condition  = 0 must be restored. Again, the net
benet from changing the wage rate by a marginal unit can be rewritten in terms
of elasticities as [see equation (13)]:
() = 
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where we have used the property of a symmetric equilibrium. For the wage adjust-
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ment, we then need an expression for
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Note that for a similar stability reason as in the previous subsection we must have
()  0 Consequently, if a joint change in the hours of work raises (re-
duces) the net marginal benet from a wage increase, all trade unions will react by
increasing (lowering) the wage rate. The direction of the wage adjustment is then
solely given by the sign of
()


=  + (  0)
μ
1 	

¶
 
 (
)


	


+



[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶
 (31)
Proceeding in an analogous way to the previous subsection, it is instructive to have
a closer look at the impact of a joint reduction in the hours of work on the marginal
benet and marginal cost of increasing the wage rate. The rst term in the upper
line of equation (31) captures that a joint marginal reduction in the working hours
also reduces the marginal benet from raising the wage rate since all employed
union members receive less total wage compensation. Since the reduction in the
hours of work also lowers the total rent from being employed, wage moderation
ceteris paribus becomes less interesting for the unions; see the second term in (31).
Reducing the hours of work in all sectors will boost the countrywide employment
level and therefore increase the re-employment probability of unemployed union
members. Unions will ceteris paribus respond with more aggressive wage claims, see
the third term in equation (31). Finally, we have to take into account that a joint
cut in 
 has an impact on the labor demand elasticity with respect to the wage rate.
This eect is captured by the last term in (31) and can go in either direction. If
the collective reduction in the hours of work renders the labor demand elasticity 
more (less) elastic, the wage rate becomes more (less) costly (at the margin) as a
trade union instrument. For 
  0 we can unambiguously infer that unions
react to the cut in 
 by raising the wage rate (see Appendix 5 for details). This
condition would be sucient to conclude that the employment eect is smaller than
the one under full cooperation.
In fact, Hunt (1999) presents empirical evidence that German unions claim higher
wages following a reduction in standard hours of work to keep monthly earning
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almost unaected. Similar evidence is reported for Sweden (see, e.g., Jacobson and
Ohlsson 2000 or Skans 2004).
Employment eect
In the light of the trade unions’ potential wage response, the overall impact of
a reduction in working time on employment is ambiguous a priori. Formally, it is
given by
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As is shown in Appendix 6, we are able to write the overall employment eect of
a joint cut in the hours of work, taking into account that all trade unions react by
adjusting their wage rate as follows:
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When discussing the direction of the total employment eect, it is again necessary to
interpret the terms in brackets of equation (32). This time, the change of the labor
demand elasticity with respect to the wage rate becomes important. If it becomes
more elastic, ceteris paribus, either due to the initial joint reduction in the working
time (
  0) or the subsequent joint increase in the wage rate (  0),
the wage rate becomes a more costly instrument for the unions and is therefore not
used to go all the way back to the initial equilibrium. This, in turn, contributes to a
positive overall employment eect when working time is reduced. A second eect is
relevant in terms of overall employment. Even if we fully abstract from the changes
in the labor demand elasticity, there is, in general, a favorable employment eect
since   ; see the last two terms in brackets of equation (32).
In the light of the ambiguity of the overall employment eect so far, the term
in brackets in equation (32) can be written as (2 +  000 00) Interestingly,
from (16) we already know that we must have 2 +  000	
 00  0 in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium. As ()  0 and   0, the whole expression in (32)
then becomes non-positive. The only possibility of a zero employment eect is the
extreme case of  = 0 In this scenario, the trade unions will claim suciently higher
wages in response to the reduced working time such that any employment eect is
fully washed away. The explanation runs as follows. For  = 0 we know from
equations (5) and (9) that  =  and () · = (
) · 
 so that the
wage rate amounts to a perfect mimicry of the working hours in restoring the initial
Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, i.e. for   0 a favorable total employment eect
remains since the wage rate is not fully used to go back to the initial employment
level. In fact, the second-order condition of the unions’ decision problemwith respect
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to the wage rate is sucient to ensure that the adjustment of the wage rate is small
enough not to compensate the eect of the working time reduction.
Welfare eect
For the repercussion of each union’s welfare, we might expect a similar pattern as
in the preceding subsection in the sense that the sign of the employment eect also
determines the direction of the welfare eect. This can be conrmed by inspecting
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Repercussion on prot income
Finally, we can again analyze whether prot income is increased or not following
a collective reduction in working time with wage autonomy left to each single trade
union. We arrive at:
[  
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
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Recalling the reference case of full coordination [see equation (19)], prots remain
unchanged when the wage rate is not adjusted and employment and working time
are perfect substitutes ( = 1). However, if the wage rate remains at discretion of
unions, the special case of perfect substitutes implies that recipients of prot income
are worse-o if unions agree to jointly reduce working time. To see this, note that
equation (8) implies that  remains constant for  = 1 and Appendix 5 shows
that this is sucient to infer that 
  0
4 Concluding remarks
When individual decision-making imposes external eects on others, the resulting
equilibrium will be inecient. It is well known that cooperating on the externality
generating activity can make all participants better o. In our framework, we apply
this idea to decentralized trade union behavior, where the externality runs through
each small union’s contribution to the overall (un)employment rate. However, each
union has two possibilities to impose the external eect - by choosing its wage rate
and the hours of work, respectively. An internalization agreement should therefore
cover both of them. If only a partial agreement on one instrument is possible, the
outcome of such coordination is less clear-cut. In general, we can conclude that
they are less eective. For very special cases, they have no impact at all or are even
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counterproductive. A constant marginal disutility of labor can contribute to such
extreme cases. Together with employment and working time being perfect substi-
tutes, partial wage cooperation is unable to aect employment and welfare. Given
that employment and the hours of work are less than perfectly substitutable, joint
(partial) wage moderation even lowers employment if the labor demand becomes
less elastic with respect to the working hours.
It is important to note that the only coordination agreement considered in this
contribution is among individual trade unions. On the one hand, this approach
might be a suitable starting point as it puts a lower bound what can be expected
from coordination given that it is not possible to attract other participants in nego-
tiations (government, rms). Thus, in our setting, the best outcome can only entail
eliminating externalities between trade unions. On the other hand, of course, even
stronger eects on employment and welfare are possible if other parties eectively
joint the agreement. In the spirit of McDonald and Solow (1981), both parties can
commit to policies that deviate from their individual optimum but make both parties
together better o.
What is the policy relevance of this contribution? Basically, our analysis has
only shown that institutional arrangement matter for the eectiveness of agree-
ments among private agents. If trade unions can inuence the employment level
in their respective sector by using more than one instrument and the employment
level imposes external eects on members of other unions, then any cooperation
must include all these instruments that aect employment. If this is not possible,
coordination is most likely to be less eective or may even be doomed to fail. This is
what policy makers should be interested in. In the light of the (potential) inability
of private institutions to correct for an external eect, assigning this internalization
to the government will, in principle, perform better. The results therefore sup-
port government interventions which make unions be aware of the full costs of their
behavior.
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Appendix
1. Fully centralized wage setting
A countrywide monopoly trade union would maximize
max
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which, again, imply 	   and   0(
). However, rewriting both conditions
shows that the wage rate and the hours of work are now chosen to attain a higher
employment level as is the case with decentralized trade unions. To see this, we
express both conditions as
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The terms in curly brackets are equivalent to the rst-order conditions in the case
of decentralized decision problem. Since in both equations an additional negative
term enters, a central union perceives the marginal net benet from increasing 
and 
, respectively, to be lower and will therefore choose lower levels of both the
wage rate and the hours of work. In turn, this implies a higher employment level in
the country.
2. The sign of 

Recalling equation (22) in the text, i.e.



= (
)

·
μ
(
)


¶1

we know that stability of the Nash equilibrium requires (
)
  0 Hence,

½



¾
= 
½
(
)

¾
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We have
(
)

= 
+ 

μ
1 	

¶
  	


 (
)

+


[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶

which is rewritten as
(
)

= 
 (1 + ) 	



·
1 + 

 (
)


¸
+


[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶

As stated in the text,   1 From equation (13), we know that


 (
)


= 
μ
1 	

¶1

i.e. since 0  (1  	)  1 we have  [
 (
)] 
  1 Hence, for
  0 we can unambiguously sign
(
)

 0
so that a joint wage cut increases the hours of work.
3. Derivation of equation (26): The employment eect of a partial agree-
ment with respect to the wage rate
The overall employment eect is given by
	

=
	

+



	



Inserting in the corresponding expression for 
 this becomes
	

=
1
(
)

·
(
)


	

 (
)

	


¸

Plugging in (23) and (24) and using (15) as given in the text, the expression in
brackets is written as follows·μ





 




¶
(
 (
))
μ
1 	

¶
  


00
¸
	
Using equation (13), i.e.
[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶
= 


 (33)
this can be rewritten asμ





 



 



00
¶
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4. The welfare eect of a partial agreement with respect to the wage rate
We have


=


+






=
μ
(
)


¶1
	

½

 · (
)


+ [  0(
)] · (
)

¾
	
where, after using (23), (24) and (15), the term in curly brackets can be written as
μ




  




¶
[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶
+ 

00
Recalling equation (33), this expression reads
μ




 



 +




00
¶




5. The sign of 

As has been set out in the text, the sign of ()
 also determines the direction
of the adjustment of the wage rate following a joint reduction in the hours of work.
Rewriting this expression yields
()


=  + (  0)
μ
1 	

¶
 
 (
)


μ
1 	

¶


 (
)


 +



[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶

Using equation (13), the third term in the upper line is equivalent to

 (
)


μ
1 	

¶
 = 
so that we are able to write
()


= (1 + ) + (  0)
μ
1 	

¶
 
 (
)



+



[
 (
)]
μ
1 	

¶

where all term in the upper line are negative in sign. Thus, if 
  0 a
joint reduction in 
 will induce trade unions to unambiguously raise the wage as a
response.
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6. Derivation of equation (32): The employment eect of a partial agree-
ment with respect to the working hours
We have,
	


=
	


+



	


=
1
()
·
	


()

 	

()


¸
(34)
where the term in brackets can be written as
	
·
   +
μ



 


¶

 (
)

μ
1 	

¶¸

Again, making use of equation (33), this can be simplied to
	
·
   +
μ




 

¶



¸
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